Although a funerary epigram attributed to the Hellenistic epigrammatist Dioskorides (Gr. Anth. 7.37) calls Electra and Antigone «the top» (akron) among Sophokles’ plays, and Electra together with Ajax and Oedipus1 comprised Sophokles’ famous “Byzantine triad”, modern readers have not always been enthusiastic about this play. Kamerbeek (1974, vii) confessed his dislike. The Budé’s Mazon (Dain 1958, 133) remarked that Sophokles saw in Aeschylus’ Oresteia only «a pretext to deploy his virtuosity without putting into it much of himself». Fewer scholars have worked on Electra than on Sophokles’ other plays (Woodard 1964, 163), and those who do so, typically debate what would seem the extraordinary question whether Orestes and Elektra were justified in killing their mother with no moral qualms. As with Shakespeare’s King John, uncertainty over Electra’s moral stance may have contributed to the play’s lack of popularity. In a fine essay Matthew Wright (2005, 172) calls it «not surprising» that «with their penchant for ambiguity and unanswered questions», many late twentieth-century critics (and Wright himself) prefer a “dark” view of this drama. I also think it dark, although not from a taste for ambiguity. Most of the scholars Wright lists think the play dark or light, rather than ambiguous. All three late plays of Sophokles are morally dark2. Sophokles’ meanings are often not

1 First presented on November 10, 2015 at Sophocles Day III in Ferrara, this essay is dedicated to Giulio Guidorizzi, in gratitude for his excellent work on Sophokles and our friendly scholarly collaborations over many years. Many thanks also to Angela Andrisano for organizing a productive and friendly conference, and to Laura Pepe for translating my abstract.

2 Most recent scholars date El. sometime in the 410s, near Phil. and OC. For SEGAL (1981, 291), Phil. (of 409) and OC (of 406) «were written probably within a decade of the Electra». Francis DUNN (2012, 107) observes that Electra is «often placed in the same general time period as Phil. and OC […] If we assume that Electra was produced a few years before Philoctetes […]» MARCH (2001) dates El. c. 413-10. On the dispute over the
immediately obvious: for example whether we are to admire or dislike Antigone’s Antigone, or whether at the end of Philoctetes Neoptolemos still deceives Philoktetes. On the most obvious level such complexities give his audiences something to think about. At least in most cases, reflection and other passages will show his meaning. Although Antigone is sometimes incoherent (Blundell 1989) and even subversive (Sourvinou-Inwood 1989), it was Sophokles’ masterstroke that she is proved right3. In Electra, the remorseless killing of their mother by Klytemnestra’s children is a moral horror. Elektra’s mourning through much of the play is probably another reason why some dislike it. However, Sophokles was ever a restless innovator. In contrasting ways his protagonists are all imperfect, each with unattractive qualities, complicating their dramas in interesting ways. From start to finish, Electra depicts a world gone wrong.

In a mostly successful career spanning some 64 years, Sophokles is said to have written either 123 or 113 plays, in total length equal to some fifteen or sixteen Iliads, possibly more or less on a rhythm of four new plays every other year for Athens’ two dramatic festivals4. Perhaps in part because of his relentless writing schedule, many of his plays share story patterns and themes, although his dramatic skills were such that many of these similarities have passed unnoticed. In one notable example, the plots of the four earlier plays are similar. In Ajax, probably of 444 as I shall argue elsewhere, Ajax was cheated of his prize and so tried to destroy the Greek army and its leaders. He failed and kills himself. The principal characters debate and finally grant him an honorable burial. In Antigone of 442, Polyneikes, cheated of his throne, attacked and tried to destroy his own city, and was killed. The play’s characters debate and finally grant him an honorable burial, although Antigone and Haimon die. In Women of Trachis, which I date c. 438, Herakles destroyed the town of Oechalia also through uncontrollable emotion (lust for a woman), leading to his and his wife’s deaths. In the last part of the play he arranges for the disposal of his own body. In Oedipus which I date c. 434, Oedipus causes the deaths of many fellow Thebans along with their crops and livestock, and through uncontrollable

4 See MÜLLER (1984, 60-77). The math is pretty close, even disregarding the vicissitudes of a busy life: four plays every other year for some 62 years yields 124 plays.
emotion (anger: 806-12) the death of his father. In the play his wife kills herself and he contemplates killing himself, in the end insisting on being banished from Thebes. At the start of these plays, the world of the protagonist – Ajax, Antigone, Deianeira, Herakles, and Oedipus – is about to explode. By contrast, all three protagonists in the late plays (Elektra, Philoktetes, and OC’s Oedipus) have endured a seeming eternity of suffering which they are about to end.

In addition to story patterns, many themes and ideas recur in these plays. In *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*, Mary Whitlock Blundell traces Sophokles’ critique of an important Greek ethical principle through five of the seven plays (the theme occurs in all seven plays, as she notes). Other recurring themes and ideas include time and change; ignorance passing into knowledge, especially self-knowledge; fate and personal responsibility; the gods; and the power of hate (*Aj.*, *Tr.*, *El.*, *Phil.*, *OC*).

My current Sophokles project focuses on a different group of major, related, and mostly unnoticed themes. The four earlier plays share a cluster of these themes, all relevant to the years when they were written. Among these is the aristocracy, who deserve respect provided they behave well, a main theme of *Ajax*. (For one example of many, at 1344f. Odysseus tells Agamemnon that it is *dikaion* to bury Ajax because he was a nobleman, *esthlos*). This theme recurs in *Women of Trachis*, for example with the noble Iole (307-28), and in *Antigone*, but only in one passage (37f.) where Antigone tells Ismene that she, Ismene, will soon show if she is «*eugenēs* by nature, or *kakē* from *esthloi*».

Ahead of aristocracy, the main theme of *Antigone* is the worthiness and courage of women, earlier a subtheme in *Ajax*’s Tekmessa, as it will be in *Women of Trachis* and probably *Phaidra* of the later 430s, against Euripides’ scandalous first *Hippolytos* which portrayed Phaidra as very wicked. Other themes in the early plays are city officials who begin well but become irrational and tyrannical (*Aj.*, *Ant.*, *Oed*); a “generation gap” between an irrational older generation and the reasonable young (*Ant.*, *Tr.*, *Oed*); divine laws superior to city laws (*Aj.*, *Ant.*, *Oed*); and slaves who merit sympathy (*Aj.*, *Tr.*, *Oed*).

These themes recur in the late plays as well, although as we shall see, from the perspective of their different era they have sometimes been transformed. A cluster of new

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5 For a fuller exposition of these themes in *Ant.*, see my *Sophokles’ Lucky Day: Antigone* (WALLACE 2013), and, for *Ajax*, WALLACE (2010, 137-54).
themes, all of them dark, recur in *El., Phil.* and *OC.* After tracing these themes in *El.*, I shall consider why Sophokles brought these ideas together for a play of the later 410s, and draw conclusions from the appearance of most of these same ideas especially in Thucydides.

First, bold and courageous women return as a major theme in *El.,* a play which often echoes *Antigone,* not least in their protagonists’ central motivator, respect for the dead. In Sophokles’ early plays female protagonists may be problematic – Antigone, Deianeira, probably Phaidra – but they are superior to their male counterparts Kreon, Herakles, possibly Theseus, compare also Ajax with the virtuous Tekmessa. Elektra dominates *Electra,* she’s on stage some 93% of the time, and delivers some 43% of the lines. In character she too is mostly superior to the men of her play and especially to her brother Orestes, except in the play’s final 184 lines when she joins him in killing their mother and Aigisthos (1326-1510).

The problem with Elektra – and to a significantly lesser extent with Antigone also – is that she is at best only sometimes admirable. In the first 937 lines of the play, she also seems to be what my students call a “drama queen”, self-centered, self-absorbed, explosively emotional and irrational, often viewing the world in absolutes. Through two-thirds of the play, Electra mixes incessant mourning, despair, and anger, with intelligent and passionate debate. As Segal has noted (1981, 250), we first meet Elektra as «a cry from inside […] a helpless voice of lamentation trapped in the interior of the palace (77-79)». While praying for her brother’s return and for the gods of the dead to avenge her father’s death (109-18: the prologue’s plot summation), she comes on stage lamenting and says she will never cease doing so (86-120), a view which the chorus confirms (121-27). They ask her why she continually laments, but Elektra refuses to stop (132-36). The Chorus responds that prayers and laments are ineffective, they cannot raise Agamemnon from the dead (137-44). Electra replies that only a fool forgets dead parents; she appreciates Niobe and the nightingale who lament (145-52). Yes, but like Antigone, could she not do something? The chorus notes that she is far more mournful than her siblings and that Orestes will come (153-63). Elektra then describes her situation, with no husband or children (echoing Antigone), and only deceptive messages from Orestes. The chorus tells her to trust in Zeus (176) and curb her «overpainful anger and hate» (177). Elektra repeats that she lacks children and a husband, and notes that she lives as a stranger in her father’s house, wearing poor clothes and eating alone (187-92). The chorus describes
Agamemnon’s murder by *dolos* (193-200: *dolos* [line 37] will also lead to the murders of Klytemnestra and Aigisthos). Electra recalls, and prays to Zeus to punish his killers (201-12). The chorus says her wretched state is of her own making, don’t fight with the *dunatoi* (213-20). Elektra’s speech from 221 is darker. «I have been forced to do terrible things in the midst of terrible things, I know my anger (*orga*) does not escape me, but amid terrible things I will not stop my calamitous ways». From 237 she argues intelligently and passionately that one must not forget, and in defense of *aidôs* and *eusebeia*. The chorus agrees with her: «you win» (253). From 254 to 309 Elektra gives a further, intelligent, passionate, sometimes furious analysis of her mourning over many years, also mentioning her noble rank («violence forces me to do these things, forgive me, for a woman who is well-born, *eugenês*»: 256f.), with the «abusive» Klytemnestra, the cowardly Aigisthos and Orestes who promises but never acts. «In such a state, it is possible *oute sophronein out’ eusebein*: not to be temperate [traditionally an aristocratic virtue] or pious. But amid the evils there is a great necessity also to practice evils» (306-309). As Hugh Lloyd-Jones observes in his Loeb edition of the play (1994, 3f.), «she herself is aware that she has become a monster of hatred and resentment, though she pleads that she has been made one by her situation and the oppression of her enemies».

Elektra now converses with the chorus (310-28), again somewhat repetitively (for example, compare 303-305 and 317-19). Chrysothemis comes on stage carrying burial offerings, explaining why she herself had not rebelled. Elektra attacks her for cowardice and *kakotês*, «baseness» in not helping to avenge her dead father (341-68). In the following 30 lines of passionate *stichomythia* (376-415), Elektra is clear-headed and determined, argumentative, and not just mournful. Chrysothemis is far more practical-minded and less principled, to the point of paradox («if one must live free, those in power must be obeyed in everything»: 339-40), to which Elektra defends her principled mourning in honor of the dead. Chrysothemis reveals that if Elektra does not stop mourning, they will send her away to a cave (374-82), another echo of Antigone. Elektra says: bring it on, she’s happy to die. They discuss Klytemnestra’s dream that Agamemnon came back to rule, because of which Chrysothemis is bringing Klytemnestra’s offerings for Agamemnon’s tomb. Elektra again prevails. Also at the chorus’ insistence (464f.), Chrysothemis agrees not to place those offerings on the tomb but items supplied by Elektra, provided Elektra does not mention it. Her words, however, are ominous. Her stress on doing (*dran*), *erga*, and silence (466-69) foreshadow the corrupt world of Orestes.
and the Pedagogue, just as her fear that she will «dare (tolmēsein) a bitter (pikran) attempt» (470f.) echoes Orestes’ final comment to Aigisthos that his death too must be pikron (1504).

After a chorus, Klytemnestra enters (516). Although she is despised by both Marsh and Finglass (who calls her «almost totally villainous», 2007, 4), she is not unsympathetic, as already with her dream (so, e.g., Segal 1981, 260-62). She gives a fine speech, where Felix Budelmann (2000, 71) says «she emerges as a thought-provoking character who, in the midst of a rhetorical argument, has the depth of a real-life person». She defends killing Agamemnon for having killed their daughter. Elektra responds (558-609), in a second hard-hitting, intelligent debate between two women. This time, however, the chorus says they are not yet certain if she, while «breathing rage», is just (610-11)\(^6\). Anger is always a dangerous emotion; and Elektra has not convinced them, as she had earlier convinced Chrysothemis. This debate is followed again by rapid exchanges (612-34), mostly on a central theme of the play, words and deeds. Klytemnestra says that Elektra will «go to every ergon of shame.” Elektra responds that «I do (prassō)» inappropriate things, «because your hate and your erga force me to do (dran) these things violently. Disgraceful pragmata are taught by disgraceful pragmata». Klytemnestra responds, «O vile and shameless, I and my words and my erga make you talk too much». Elektra: «It is you who talk, not I. For you do the ergon. The erga find the words» (612-25). Klytemnestra prays to Apollo that she live out her life in safety – a prayer we know will not be answered, as Apollo has already sent Orestes to kill her.

At 680 the Pedagogue arrives, and both women hear his false story.

At 766-87, Klytemnestra expresses maternal grief at the death of her son. «A mother cannot hate the child she bore». Again she is sympathetic. She says he threatened her and so she lived in fear, but Elektra is worse, day by day draining her lifeblood. Now she might have peace. She says to the Pedagogue that his coming will be good, if he can stop Elektra’s poluglossos boê (798).

Alone with the chorus, Elektra sinks into despair (804-70). Now Chrysothemis arrives with the happy news of finding Orestes’ offerings on Agamemnon’s tomb. Elektra convinces her that Orestes is actually dead (Elektra is of course wrong). This inspires her

\(^6\) On their reference to Elektra, see Segal 1982. With no MS support Kells and Kamerbeck believe the lines refer to Klytemnestra, missing Sophokles’ point.
plan (938 to 1057) that the two women kill Aigisthos. She does not mention Klytemnestra, and says that Aigisthos killed Agamemnon with his own hand [955-57], Homer’s version, although in my view incorrectly some have read this as duplicity to win Chrysothemis’ support. Always intransigeant, Elektra now becomes even bolder, much like Antigone. She tells Chrysothemis that she, Chrysothemis, will now have a husband and regain her freedom (970). Citizens and foreigners alike will honor them for their andreia (manly courage). She gives a great speech in praise of the two women.

Like Ismene, Chrysothemis responds that she is a woman weaker than men, and they will get into trouble if people hear what she has said. Check your orgê, learn to yield to hoi kratountes (1011, 1014). The chorus says, obey! There is no better kerdos for a man than pronoia or a nous sophos (1015-6). Elektra responds: I’ll do it myself. The sisters again argue bitterly in stichomythia (1023-54). There follows a choral ode praising Elektra (1058-97). As often, the chorus’ joy at this stage will prove mistaken.

Orestes arrives, in disguise and pretending to carry an urn with Orestes’ ashes. Electra announces that it is time for more mourning (1116) and goes into it (1126-70). The chorus begs her, «do not groan too much» (1172) and I for one agreed, now nearly at the end of the play. The truth emerges, and Elektra follows Orestes: «Since you have come to us in such a fashion, you yourself rule (arch’), as there is thumos in you» (1318f.). In 1242 Orestes says that Ares lives in women too. Through the rest of the play Elektra now changes, she becomes a conspirator, she commands silence (1398). The stabbing is quick! Elektra calls out to Orestes, «If you have strength, again!» (1415). When Aigisthos arrives, the chorus says to Elektra, «whisper a few words into his ear, and he’ll be unaware» (1438). Elektra lies to him. Aigisthos commands silence, so there is irony in 1464f., when she says she has finally learned to agree with the more powerful. When Aigisthos confronts death, Elektra refuses to allow him to speak one word. «Kill him as quickly as you can».

What do we conclude about Sophokles on Elektra? Through two-thirds of the play, Elektra engages in lamentation for the dead. As Giulio Guidorizzi discussed in his presentation on Sophokles Day III, her emotions would resonate strongly with an Athenian public who had suffered tens of thousands of casualties – fathers, sons, and

7 Some scholars including Lloyd-Jones attribute the last five lines of dialogue (1050-4) to the fragmentary Phaidra. They fit Electra perfectly.
brothers – over some two decades in the Peloponnesian War. Richard Seaford (1985) and Helene Foley in *Female Acts in Greek Tragedy* (2000, 151ff.) ponder the implications of Elektra’s obsessive lamentation in the light of women’s major public role in mourning, something women can do – although in men’s eyes perhaps best if not to excess. Rachel Kitzinger (1991) skilfully analyses Elektra’s argumentation in the first half of the play although almost entirely in a positive light, downplaying Sophokles’ indications that she is already morally compromised. Her many declarations to that effect (221-24, 256f., 306-309, 621), Sophokles’ ambiguous portrait of her from the start, and his evident sympathy for Klytemnestra, should be more directly confronted. Elektra then has her moment of glory, when she decides to take vengeance on Aigisthos herself, becoming brave like Antigone, although she has been deceived by her brother’s lies. Finally, when her brother materializes, she becomes an amoral killer, going silent and conspiratorial like him. I had mentioned the “generation gap” in Sophokles’ earlier plays: elders go out of control, while the young remain sensible and reasonable. Something like the opposite happens in *El*. We will return to these themes shortly.

In addition to women, reflections on aristocracy continue to be important in *El.*, but differently from before, and differently for Orestes and Elektra – except at the end. In line 129 Elektra calls the chorus *genethla gennaiôn*, «a race of noble ladies». In 257 Elektra calls herself *eugenês*, while Klytemnestra is *logoisi gennaia* (287), «noble in words» or (we would say) «in name only». Class words echo again at 365-67, when Elektra says to Chrysothemis that instead of being called the daughter of the best (*aristos*) father of all, she will be called the daughter of her mother, and thus to most people appear *kakê*, which can mean base-born. When she hears of Orestes’ supposed death, she calls on the aid of «*eupatridai* [an old word for nobles] of the same stock [*koinotokoi*]» (859). Elektra’s nobility then blossoms when she rises to the challenge of killing Aigisthos (in this section she does not speak of killing her mother). She exclaims to Chrysothemis, «everyone loves to look to *ta chrêsta* (noble things), o philê, be persuaded, toil for your father, struggle for

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8 Cf. PELLICCIA (2009, 36): «There is a good deal of evidence that unrestrained female lamentation was regarded by Greeks as a socially disruptive force, and Sophocles’ audience may have found Electra’s words menacing».

9 On p. 301 Kitzinger summarizes a major conclusion: «From the end of the prologue until the paidagogos’s speech ... [Elektra] creates an understanding of human justice as the expression of a harmony between feeling, thought, language, and action».

10 In *Aj.* 1020 Teuker had used a similar phrase, *doulos logoisi*, and later in *El.* 1217 Orestes «is Orestes only in *logos*». 
your brother, rescue me from kakoi/a, rescue yourself, knowing this, that to live disgracefully (aischrôs) is disgraceful for the well-born (kalôs)» (986-89). At 1081-97 the chorus praises her for being ready to die in order «to kill the twin Erínys», a curious double-single, referring to the pair Klytemnêstera Aigisthos who killed the killer Agamemnôn. «Who could be thus eupatris? None of the agathoi would wish to live kakôs (basely) [the chorus here sound like Ajax, Aj. 479f.] and disgrace their good fame (eukleia) dying namelessly, child, child, as you too have chosen the common lot of mourning, casting off what is not kalon to carry two things in one logos: to be called a sopha and arista daughter». Once Elektra sides with Orestes, however, she is not called noble again.

The chorus also praises Orestes as eupatris (162), «of noble father», and as born esthlos (322), so as to help his philoi (an irony, as he will kill his mother). But Orestes never behaves nobly, and even after his identity is revealed, he too is not called noble again.

A third recurrent theme in Sophokles is the abusive ruler, a pattern reinforced by a formulaic word order, strategêsas, then kratos or archê, then turannos. Electra begins (line 1) with Agamemnôn strategêsas, a general (something line 36 stresses Orestes is not). In line 220 the chorus tells Elektra she must not fight with hoi dunatoi, at 264 Elektra laments «I am ruled by» (archomai) her father’s murderers, in 339f. Chrysothemis says, «if I must live free (eleuthera), hoi kratountes must be listened to in everything», and in 396 she tells Elektra «to yield to hoi kratountes». Elektra replies that she will never yield to them (hupeikathein 360, cf. Aj. 668). Chrysothemis later repeats that she should yield (eikathein) to hoi kratountes (1014). At 521f. Klytemnêstera complains that Elektra says «I rule» (archô) unjustly. In her debate with Klytemnêstera (628-33) Elektra rebukes her mother, «You see? You let me say what I please, and then you are carried away into anger (orga). You do not know how to listen», a tyrant’s vice. Klytemnêstera responds, «I have permitted you to say all you will», not something tyrants say (and so positive for her), and Elektra responds (632), «Do not blame my mouth (stoma), as I will say no more». After Klytemnêstera prays to Apollo, the Pedagogue comes in, asking for the house of the turannos Aigisthos (661). Then, seeing Klytemnêstera, he says she has the look of a turannos (664). The chorus later refers to the ruling house as despotai (764); when Orestes is finally revealed Elektra says, «now only with difficulty have I had my mouth set free» (1256, cf. 1257); at the end of the play when Aigisthos thinks he will see Orestes’ corpse, he says that anyone who had «empty hopes» about Orestes «now may accept my bit [stomia emâ, compare Ant. 477, Aj. 1253f.] and not need violent chastisement from me to
teach him sense» (1460-63). Compare a similar series of words in Ajax: the Atreidai are introduced as strategoi (49); then they are basileis (188, 390); then archontes (668); finally, Agamemnon calls himself a turannos (1349-50). In Antigone, Kreon is first a stratêgos (8), then a magistrate en telei (67); at 173 Kreon says he has all the kratê and thronous and «you will never understand a person’s qualities until you see him en archais and nomois» (177); in 669 he again refers to himself as an archôn; then he says he rules the city for himself (736); at 1056 Teiresias says of Kreon, «the race bred of tyrants loves base gain»; and at 1169 the messenger says that Kreon lives in the pomp of a tyrant. Similar patterns recur in Tr. and Oed. These parallels should rule out Haslam’s proposal (1975, 149f. and 166f.), contested by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990, 42) but supported by Finglass (2007, ad loc.), that El. 1 (Agamemnon stratêgêsas) is interpolated.

A fourth theme is the superiority of gods’ laws to human or polis laws, the justice of which El. calls into question. In 579-83, in response to Clytemnestra’s defense that Agamemnon killed Iphigeneia to help Menelaus, Elektra says, «was that a reason for him to die at your hands? By what nomos? Watch out that in laying down this nomos for mortals, you are not laying down pain and repentance for yourself. For if we kill one man in retaliation for another, you would be the first to die if you meet justice (dikê)». Segal (1981, 252) rightly compares with this the final dialogue lines of the play (1505-1507, which Kamerbeek disliked and Finglass athetized11) where Orestes again refers to this savage human talio, while taking Aigisthos off to be killed: «there must be at once this justice for all, / whoever would wish to act outside the laws (pera tôn nomôn), / to kill». The Greek is curious: kteinein «to kill» oddly positioned and in the active voice. In these two passages Segal, Blundell and others have found a central moral message of the play. Segal (1981, 252) wrote, «What emerges is the inadequacy of a society whose system of justice rests on blood-vengeance, for here the avengers run the risk of coming to the same level as the criminals». In her last sentence on El., Blundell (1989, 183) concludes, «the murders are indeed just, according to the talio, but the talio is a grim and problematic form of justice».

11 Finglass here follows Dindorf and Dawe. LLOYD-JONES – WILSON (1990, 77) defend the lines «on the score of style [and] language», and rightly observe, «the general effect of the dialogue is to suggest that things are continuing as usual in the house of Atreus, and these lines make their contribution to that effect». 

By contrast, in 1041-43 the newly emboldened and aristocratic Elektra says that Chrysothemis’ are laws of expediency, not to do something that is just if it harms you, «rules by which I would not want to live». At 1095-97, in praise of Elektra, the Chorus follows up, singing of «the greatest nomima which came into existence, on account of these winning the best things (arista) by your piety toward Zeus». Similarly, in Ant. 450-55 Antigone champions «the unwritten and unshakeable nomima of the gods», as Odysseus does in Aj. 1343f. and the chorus at Oed. 865f.

Most of the new themes in El. recur in the final two plays, dividing Sophokles’ seven plays into two groups.

First, fractured families. Families are fractured in the four earlier plays – Ajax, Kreon, Herakles, Oedipus – but mostly do not want to be. In El., family members are vicious to each other. The opening of El. first indicates the fracture, with two separate prologues preceding the chorus’ parodos, a device Sophokles borrowed from Euripides’ Electra. First, Orestes, Pylades and the Pedagogue enter, plot to murder Klytemnestra and Aigisthos, then exit, hearing someone («Elektra?») groan in mourning (77). In Aeschylus’ Choephoroi, Orestes, Pylades, and Elektra all meet, but in Sophokles the Pedagogue says not to wait, they must get on and do (dran) their plan. Elektra now enters singing an aria, calling for revenge and her brother’s return. She later stresses that Orestes has long promised to come, but never does. Every message he sends is deceptive. «Always he longs, but longing he does not think it right to appear». The comment is ironic – the audience knows that Orestes has now come – and a painful observation on Orestes’ many false statements to his sister. The Pedagogue’s long message that Orestes is dead is one big lie. When Orestes finally enters in disguise, he tells his sister another false story that he carries an urn with Orestes’ ashes. He knows who she is, but persists in his false story, causing Elektra much unnecessary weeping and mourning. At one point he hesitates (1174f.): «What shall I say, where of helpless words do I go? I cannot rule my tongue». Still, for twenty more lines he does not identify himself. As for the rest of her family, Elektra hates her mother who sleeps with her father’s murderer, «if mother I must call her, she who sleeps with him» (271-74). «A mother she is called, but she is nothing equal to a mother» (1194). Wright (2005, 181-85) is excellent on the terrible, perverted relations

12 Other Euripidean elements in the play include Orestes’ recognition by a token, the signet ring, indicating that he is alive.
between Elektra and her mother. From the start Orestes and later Elektra go to kill their mother with no moral qualms or hesitation. Oedipus has equally tortured relations with his relative Kreon in OC.

A second new theme is conspiracy. Electra opens with a devious plot by Orestes and his Pedagogue to kill Orestes’ mother and her paramour, a plot which they carry out in secrecy in the rest of the play. Conspiracies recur in Philoctetes (to trick Philoktetes into coming to Troy), and by Kreon in OC (to trick Oedipus into following him back toward Thebes).

A third new theme is speedy action and no talking. In his opening speech, the Pedagogue says *ti chrê dran en tachei bouleuteon*, «it must be quickly decided what must be done (*dran*), it is no *kairos* to hesitate, but the *akmé* for deeds (*erga*)». *Kairos*, the critical moment, is a leitmotif in El. No hesitation, and no talking. Right after he acknowledges to Elektra who he is, Orestes commands silence (1236, 1238) lest anyone hear, at 1259 he says this is not the *kairos*. Elektra does not want to be silent, but at 1288 Orestes commands, no talking, it is time for action. Elektra continues to explain everything (1307-21), and Orestes again commands silence. The Pedagogue comes out rebuking them sharply for speaking in public: «fools and madmen!» (1326). Talk is dangerous, it is time for action. Elektra bursts again into passion when the Pedagogue is identified. He replies to her, «that seems to me enough», now is the *kairos erdein*. At 1372 Orestes insists, no more lengthy words: and they go to kill Klytemnestra. At the very end, Orestes says to Aigisthos, «you speak much in reply, go» inside to be killed (1501).

Fourth, when people do talk, they often lie. In lines 44 and 50 Orestes gives the Pedagogue «your *logos*», «your *muthos*», which is false. In 56 he says they will «hide a sweet *phatis* with *logos*». As we have noted, Elektra says that every message from Orestes led to disappointment (169f.). At 319 she says «he says he will come, but *phaskôn* [often with a *suggestio falsi*] he does nothing of what he says». At 357 she says that her sister Chrysothemis says she hates Klytemnestra and Aigisthos, but she hates only *en logôi*. At 666 the Pedagogue enters, «bearing sweet *logoi*» for Klytemnestra. He announces the death of Orestes in a long speech (680-763) which is fiction. Later Orestes in disguise also tells a big lie (1098-1215), even as Elektra suffers anguish right before him, finally telling her that the urn supposedly with his ashes is not Orestes except «tricked out in words», *logoi* (1217). When Elektra asks him what he means, with painful irony he replies, «I say nothing false» (1220).
Fifth, in *El.* words lose or change their meaning, notably in designating noble and slave. In his opening response to the slave Pedagogue, Orestes calls him *philtatê andrôn prospolôn,* «dearest of men attendants» (23). *Philos* designates a friend or relative, a fine word; *anêr,* man, is also fine. These words are incongruously juxtaposed with “attendant” and then *esthlos,* «noble» (24) but only *es hêmas,* «towards us», like a *hippos eugenês* a «horse nobly-born» (25). How can a slave tutor be called *philos,* *esthlos,* and *eugenês?* «Even when he is old, in terrible circumstances [en toisi deinois] he had not lost his spirit, but his ear stands erect».

A sixth, related new theme is confusion over social status. The slave Pedagogue is bossy and self-important. He speaks first in the play, using the pronoun *egô* (11) which elsewhere in Sophokles is a sign of vanity\(^{13}\); then three verbs in the first person, «I carried, I saved, I raised» (13). He addresses the young nobleman Pylades too familiarly as *philtatê xenôn,* «dearest of foreigners». He then orders that they move fast. He plays the role that Pylades should play, but Pylades says not one word in this play. Later, when Orestes makes himself known to Elektra and they talk, the Pedagogue comes out on stage and (as we have noted) rebukes them harshly for speaking where they might be overheard: «Fools and madmen, you senseless people!» (1326), «I (egô) was watching» (1331), «I took care of» (1334), «Now get rid of your long speeches» (1335). This is no way for slaves to talk to their elite masters. Then, on recognizing the Pedagogue, Elektra says «Greetings my father, for I seem to see my father in you, greetings, and know that you more than any other person I have hated and loved most in one day» (1361f.), calling this slave her father and stressing the fluid ambiguity of *philos* and *echthros.* Sophokles invokes a similar confusion over the status of Elektra. Shortly after Orestes’ opening speech to the Pedagogue, they hear Elektra groaning. The Pedagogue thinks it is one of the *prospoloi* (servants), while Orestes says it surely is Elektra. According to the MSS, the Pedagogue insists\(^{14}\) that they hurry on, rather than discovering the truth. By contrast,

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\(^{13}\) See e.g. Oedipus in *Oed.* 224-45: «I order» anyone with knowledge «to reveal everything to me (emoi) […] and not to be silent, to gar kerdos telô ’go, for I (egô) will pay the gain [a reward] […] But if you [Thebans] are silent or someone thrusts away my word [to protect someone], what I shall do from these things it is necessary to hear from me, tauta chrê kluein emou. I forbid (apaudô) this man whoever he is from this land, where I (egô) hold the kratê and thronous». He says their land is polluted, «as the Pythian oracle of the god has just now revealed to me» (actually, to Kreon). «I (egô) am such an ally to the god and to the dead man».

\(^{14}\) On no MS authority, some editors give these lines to Orestes, according to SANDBACH (1977) because it is inappropriate for the Pedagogue to include himself in the pouring of libations for Agamemnon. That however was Sophokles’ point.
throughout the play aristocratic Elektra is said to be a slave or to be treated as a slave (189-92) where she is serving as a waitress to Klytemnestra and Aigisthos; at 814 and 1192 she says she must *douleuein* again in her mother’s or father’s killers’ house.

Seventh, pleasure, *hêdonê*. Wright (2005) shows how consistently pleasure (and also joy, *chara*) is shown to be perverted. In line 286 Elektra complains that she is not allowed to feel as much *hêdonê* in lamentation as her *thumos* wants. In 871-73, Chrysothemis re-enters proclaiming «By *hêdonê* to you, most dear (*philtatê*), I am pursued (*diôkomai*) [...] for I bring pleasures (*hêdonas*) and relief» from Elektra’s troubles, as she has found a lock of hair that signals Orestes’ presence. On the curious verb *diôkomai* Wright suggests (2005, 180), «perhaps *hounding* her (with the slightest hint of the Erinyes?)». At 891 Elektra tells Chrysothemis to speak, «if for you there is some *hêdonê* in the *logos*». After Chrysothemis tells of finding Orestes’ hair, Elektra ridicules her, and she replies, «Do I not say these things toward *hêdonê*?» (921). Elektra would think that a false pleasure. At 1153f., Elektra addresses the urn: «our mother who is no mother is crazed (*mainetai*) with *hêdonê*», at news of Orestes’ death, another strange choice of verb. Later, Elektra herself experiences *hêdonê*. At 1271f., Orestes says he hesitates to check Elektra’s rejoicing, but fears she has been conquered (*nikan*) by *hêdonê*, again a strangely negative expression. She replies, «don’t deprive me of the *hêdonê* of your face» (1277), although he does not really care about her. She adds, «these *hêdonai* I gained from you» (1302). In the final lines of the drama (1503 – I am happy to add this to Wright’s discussion), Orestes says to Aigisthos, «so that you not die *kath’ hêdonên*, I have to see that this tastes bitter for you».

*Hêdonê* again is an ironic paradox: to die according to pleasure.

El’s seven dark new themes are reinforced by three points mentioned only in this play, not in *Phil.* or *OC*, but equally dark.

First in the prologue comes greed for profit (*kerdos*) on the part of the future matricide. In plotting his conspiracy, Orestes says that no word is base (*kakon*) if it leads to *kerdos*; he will become *archeploutos*, «master of the wealth» of his household. By contrast, on hearing the «news» of Orestes’ death, Klytemnestra asks (766-68) whether this is happy news or «terrible but profitable» (*deina men, kerdê de*)? She decides, «my state is painful, if I save my life by evils». Here again Klytemnestra contrasts favorably with Orestes, the older better than the younger generation.
Second: dark trends characterized intellectual developments during the Peloponnesian War. After saying «no word with profit is bad», Orestes remarks, «Often before now I have seen even hoi sophoi by logos falsely dying. Then, when they come home again, they are held in greater honor» (62-64). As Finglass observes (2007, ad loc.), Greek tradition includes various shaman-like figures who disappear and then reappear, notably in Herodotus, but none of these deliberately spread lies about disappearing. It is unclear if these shamans were or could be called sophoi. Craik (1980) did not pick up the El. passage, but shows that hostility to sophists is attested in Phil. and OC, while in earlier plays the word sophos is positive (Aj. 581 of a doctor, 783 of the seer Kalchas, 1091 of wise men, and 1374 of wise Odysseus). In Phil. 423, sopha, wise things, are good, but in line 99 rhetores are bad.

Third and finally, violating oaths. In line 47 Orestes instructs the Pedagogue to tell his false story on oath, in any case not something that Apollo ordered him to do.

Why did Sophokles bring together these ten new themes for a play of the later 410s? Writing in this same period, Thucydides and in one instance Ps.-Xenophon, both antidemocratic upper-class Athenians like Sophokles, closely echo the concerns expressed in Sophokles’ late plays. Our ten new themes all recur in Thucydides, notably (but not only) in his description of social collapse during the plague at Athens (430-426 BC), and then in virtually every line of his description (III 82f.) of stasis in Corcyra and elsewhere in and after 427, with horrors he calls characteristic of their time. Except on two themes (women and the aristocracy), Thucydides, Sophokles, and (on one point) Ps.-Xenophon thus reveal what we may suppose to be a standard conservative Athenian understanding of Athens’ degeneration during the Peloponnesian War.

First, fractured families. In III 82, 6 at Corcyra Thucydides says that «family ties were weaker than to hetairetikon (faction), because factions were more ready to dare without excuses». At III 81, 5 he says, «father killed son». At VI 85, 1, the Athenian democratic politician Euphemos («Good-speaker») remarks, «To a tyrant man or a city having power, nothing is unreasonable which is to its interest, nor is anyone a kinsman who

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cannot be relied upon; in every case one must be enemy or philos according to kairos, the critical time»

Second, murderous conspiracy. In III 82, 5 Thucydides observes, «he who succeeded in a plot (epibouleusas) was intelligent, and he who suspected one was even more clever». At III 82, 8, he continues, «striving in every way to get the better of each other they dared the most awful deeds, and sought revenges still more awful, not pursuing these within the bounds of justice and what was advantageous to the city but limiting them, both sides alike only by the moment’s hêdonê».

Third, action not words was needed at critical moments. At III 83, 3 Thucydides says, «Those of lesser intelligence usually won the day, for being afraid of their own defects and the intelligence of their opponents, lest they be worsted in logoi […], they boldly resorted to erga». Contrast Perikles in the Funeral Oration (II 40, 2f.): «We Athenians decide public questions for ourselves […] in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. We are most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake». By contrast, after Perikles, Kleon complains (III 37, 4) that clever people want to dominate discussions, and eventually bring ruin. «We ought to act and not be so excited by cleverness and a contest of intelligence, as to advise the masses contrary to our own judgment».

Fourth, words change their meaning. According to Thuc. III 82, 4, at Corcyra «they changed the customary meaning of words for deeds (erga), in the light of what they thought was justified». (See also Plat. Resp. 560e-561a, for the soul of democratic man).

Fifth, confusion over social status, in particular as to who was a slave and who a citizen. Ps.-Xenophon (Ath. Pol. I 10f.) discusses how similar slaves and metics are to citizens at Athens, in their lack of discipline, their appearance, their dress, and their freedom of speech and conduct. «Slaves won’t step aside for you, and one may not strike them». Some slaves live in luxury or even magnificence.

Sixth, pleasure, hêdonê, which I have mentioned above under «Second, murderous conspiracy» at Corcyra in III 82. In addition, in III 83 Thucydides says that people now acted purely for the hêdonê of their faction. In the Funeral Oration, Thucydides has

16 See also IV 27, 4: kairos as «favorable opportunity»; also II 34 and IV 59, 3; and WILSON (1989, 147-51), also noting parallels in Aj. and Phil.
Perikles misrepresent the democratic ideal of «living as you like» by an extreme antidemocratic perversion of that ideal. In Athens, Perikles says, people can «do according to pleasure», *dran kath’ hédonên*. Thucydides’ plague passage is often regarded as the factual antilogy (the *erga*) to the Funeral Oration’s *logoi*. Just so, in the plague at II 53, 1, Thucydides says that people no longer concealed that they were acting *kath’ hedonên*.

Seventh, greed. In the Corcyra passage (III 83, 1), Thucydides observes that «the cause of all these troubles was the love of power operating through greed, *pleonexia*». Loyalty was ensured not by fear of divine anger but by sharing in the rewards of crime. In III 38, 2 he uses the phrase, *epaireomenos* by *kerdos*. At III 81, 4 he remarks that at Corcyra, «some men, because money was owed to them, were killed by those who had borrowed it». In II 53, 3, he writes that «whatever was immediately sweet and profitable (*kerdaleon*) was thought both honorable and expedient».

Eighth, sophists and corrupt speech. This critique is everywhere implied in Thucydides’ antilogies, full of falsehoods and deceptive language. In the Mitylenean debate (III 38, 2-7) Kleon makes the point directly, comparing Athenian assembly-goers to «spectators attending a performance by sophists».

Ninth, false oaths. As in part I have quoted, at III 82, 6f. Thucydides writes,

> Their pledges (*pisteis*) to one another they confirmed not by divine law (*theios nomos*) as by common transgressions of the law... And if in any case oaths (*horkoi*) of reconcilement were exchanged, for the moment only were they binding, since either side had given them merely to meet the emergency, having at the time no other resource; but he who, when the opportunity offered and he found his enemy off his guard, was the first to pluck up courage, found his revenge sweeter because of the [i.e., violated] pledge than if he had openly attacked, and took into account not only the greater safety of such a course, but also that, by winning through deceit, he was gaining besides the prize for intelligence.

At the start of the war, oaths and the breaking of oaths still had force (II 5, 5-7). During the plague (II 53, 4), Thucydides writes that «no fear of gods or law of men restrained people, for seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that worshipping or not was the same».

Tenth, on obeying the laws. At II 37, 3, Perikles had said that the Athenians followed both the laws and the unwritten laws of the gods (as in Sophokles’ *Antigone*). Then, in
the Mytilenean debate (III 37, 3f.), a democratic perversion: Kleon says that «a city which has inferior nomoi that are unmovable is better than one whose laws are good but without authority […] Those who wish to seem wiser than the laws […] generally bring their cities to ruin». Then a breakdown: in the Corcyra passage (III 82, 6) as we have seen, Thucydides says that «factions were not entered into for the common good in conformity with the prescribed laws, but for greed contrary to the established laws. Their pledges to one another were confirmed not so much by divine law as by common transgression of the law». As I have noted, Thucydides on the plague (II 53, 1) calls this a period of greater lawlessness.

On two points Sophokles and Thucydides differ. First, Thucydides says little about women. Second, he does not directly acknowledge the political degeneration of the upper classes, who after 429 abandoned democratic politics and retreated into private clubs (hetaireiai), conspiring against the democracy. However, he does lament the disappearance of a noble spirit. At Corcyra, «Fair words by opponents were received with caution as to their actions, if these had the upper hand, and not with gennaiotês, a noble spirit (III 82, 7). At III 83, in a wider frame, he laments «the simplicity which is so large an element in a noble character (to gennaion) was laughed at and disappeared». But Thucydides will not recognize the harm that the anti-democratic, philolaconian upper classes did to Athens, in 415, in 411, and in 404 which he saw but would not write about. He blames the masses, the democracy, and banausic demagogues for Athens’ troubles, not the elite, who were culpable and after 404 virtually disappear.

On the central issues of morality, Wright (2005, 172 n. 1) lists a number of «notable 'light' readings» of El. (Orestes and Elektra simply act justly in killing their mother), by J. Schlegel, B. Anderson, A. Burnett, G. Kirkwood, R. Kitzinger17, R. Jebb, K. Reinhardt, P.T. Stevens, C. Whitman, J. Marsh, and T.B.L. Webster, who later however apparently had second thoughts18. David Konstan (2008) has defended a «light» reading of Electra, concluding that the play may celebrate the overthrow of abusive usurpers of power as happened in Athens in 411. Wright notes that «Gilbert Murray, under the influence of Schlegel, went too far in this direction, describing the play, somewhat absurdly, as a ‘combination of matricide and good spirits’». Wright (2005, 172 n. 3) also lists various

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17 I add that Kitzinger changes to a dark interpretation for the last third of the play.
18 See KELLS (1986, 153).
«dark» interpretations, first by J. Sheppard in 1918 and 1927, then by H. Friis Johansen, J. Kamerbeck, J. Kells, R. Minadeo, G. Ronnet, R. Winnington-Ingram, and R. Seaford, although this list should also include C. Segal (1981), M. Blundell (1989), and Wright himself. Also, Kells (1973, 2) and J.F. Davidson (1988, 45-72) think it unclear whether Orestes and Elektra are justified in killing their mother. Finglass (2007) sees both positive and negative points, although he seems to end up negative.19

«I was compelled to terrible things in the midst of terrible things» (221). «Violence forces me to do these things, forgive me, for a woman who is well-born» (256f.). «Evil things necessarily give rise to evil things» (308f.). «Disgraceful things are taught by disgraceful things» (621). My comments make clear what I think of morality in this play. If Klytemnestra is complicated, Orestes remains throughout a cold-blooded killer, lying to his sister over many years and in the play, and feeling no anguish about killing his mother, in contrast to Aeschylus’ Orestes in a play which Sophokles constantly echoes. Encompassed by evil, his sister Elektra is and becomes like him. At 1328-30 the Pedagogue asks them, «is there no inborn sense (nous engenês) in you, that you do not recognize that you are not merely close to but in the greatest kaka?». Jebb, Lloyd-Jones, Grene, and Raeburn all translate kaka «dangers», in the light of what the Pedagogue goes on to say. But surely Sophokles meant the audience to hear something more ominous, as in 308f. which repeats this phrase? On the central issue of family, Wright correctly concludes (2005, 178), «This is a dark, terrible play about a dysfunctional family whose relationships and emotional states are freakishly at odds with what ought to be the case». As many other issues in this play confirm, Sophokles (and Thucydides) condemned the mores of their age. Sophokles has misled many readers by portraying the terrible behavior in this play as «the new normal». That in no way excuses it.

At the start of this essay, I mentioned some scholars’ dissatisfaction with El. The play may show several indications of haste. At line 47 Orestes instructs the Pedagogue to tell his false story on oath. The Pedagogue never does so. In Chekhov’s famous dramatic principle, «Remove everything that has no relevance to the story. If you say in the first chapter that there is a rifle hanging on the wall, in the second or third chapter it

19 MACLEOD (2001) is a valiant effort to explicate Apollo’s dolos in pursuing just killings, and Elektra’s aischron which yet is sanctioned by the ethical code of the polis, in upholding eusebeia and sôphrosynê toward a dikê which restores order to oikos and polis. What is shameful can be just. (FINGLASS 2005 critiques one part of MacLeod’s thesis).
absolutely must go off. If it’s not going to be fired, it shouldn’t be hanging there»

Sophokles may have forgotten to include the Pedagogue’s false oath.

In addition, excessive mourning does not entirely «become» Elektra. Although she frequently defends her mourning by argument, and as I have noted, all of Sophokles’ protagonists have problematic characters, the chorus and we get rather tired of hearing her moan and groan, and also repeat herself, for example on not having a husband or child. Right at the opening of her play, Antigone took immediate action. Emphasis may not justify including two unnecessarily long deceptive stories, both addressed to Elektra, first by the Pedagogue about Orestes’ death in a chariot race, then on the death of Orestes by Orestes in disguise, although I take the point that both men otherwise stress the need for action not words and hence their lengthy speeches are lying. Might Sophokles have meant one of them to be cut or reduced, only then to proceed as the play itself was not too long? If as I suspect OC is unfinished, what remained to be done was to reduce that play’s excessive length.

Yet unhappiness with this play has not been universal. In Word and Action (1979, 20f.), Bernard Knox recalled,

I once saw, in a small theater in Piraeus, a magnificent performance, in modern Greek, of Sophocles’ Electra. The audience was audibly and visibly in tears during Electra’s great speech over the urn which she thinks contains her brother’s ashes [1126-70] and was profoundly moved by the joy of the recognition scene [1171-1235]. When, during the offstage murder of Clytemnestra by her son, Electra, left on stage, screamed to Orestes: “Strike her twice, if you have the strength” […], a well-dressed, middle-aged man sitting next to me (he looked rather like a bank manager) jumped to his feet and, applauding vigorously, shouted “Bravo! Bravo!”

Notwithstanding Mazon’s judgment that Sophokles did not «put much of himself» into this play, the opposite is true, in powerful new ways. As for morality, Sophokles describes a cold-blooded matricide but by no means endorses it. This is a nasty play for a nasty time. To be repeated in Philoctetes.

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20 The internet commonly cites as the source of this remark S. Shchukin, Memoirs 1911, a book I cannot trace. Also, none of the citations includes a page number.
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